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Abstract
I study information gathering for rent-seeking purposes in contracting. In
my model, an agent learns his payoﬀ type only after accepting a contract, but
can at costs acquire imperfect information while deliberating whether to accept.
I show that the principal deters the acquisition if and only if the costs are
high. The result stands in contrast to a ﬁnding by Crémer and Khalil (1992),
who demonstrate that the acquisition of perfect information will always be
deterred. A key insight is that the case of imperfect information is an instance
of a sequential-screening problem.
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1 Introduction
This paper oﬀers a new perspective on information gathering for rent-seeking purposes
in contracting. Consider the following procurement relationship. A principal seeks
to buy parts, which an agent can produce. The agent's production costs are at ﬁrst
unknown to both parties. After accepting a contract, the agent privately learns the
exact state when he makes the necessary preparations for production. In particular,
he learns his costs early enough so that the output level could still be adjusted, if the
contract allows this. While deliberating whether to accept, he can acquire preliminary
information, but at an extra expense.
The acquisition of such precontractual information would be a rent-seeking ac-
tivity: From a social perspective, the information is redundant, and its acquisition
thus wasteful, given that uncertainty resolves in any case before production. To the
agent, on the other hand, the information may be valuable, because it would allow
him to forecast more precisely whether or not the oﬀered contract would be proﬁtable
for himself. A similar situation prevails with the sale of experience goods. Here, the
consumers may be able to gather information about their valuation before making
the purchase decision, which has little social value if the sellers can take back and
resell the good.
How does the possibility for such rent seeking aﬀect contract design? Speciﬁcally,
to what distortions does it lead? That is the question that I address in this paper.
In a seminal paper, Crémer and Khalil (1992) (hereafter `CK') demonstrate that if
precontractual information would already remove all uncertainty, the principal will
design the contract such that the agent accepts without acquiring information. I
consider the case of imperfect information. I show that, there, the principal deters
the acquisition if and only if the agent's investigation costs exceed some cutoﬀ. A key
insight is that the case of imperfect information is an instance of a sequential-screening
problem.1
1To be precise, it is irrelevant in both CK's and my analysis whether the agent learns the
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The result, and the importance of the imperfection of precontractual information,
can be explained as follows. Ex post, the agent will earn a rent, given that he will
learn his payoﬀ type (i.e., in the above procurement setting, his production costs)
privately. Since he will learn the type only after the signing of the contract, the
principal can try to extract the expected rent with a participation fee. But now, by
acquiring information, the agent has the costly option to examine whether his actual
rent is likely to be larger than the fee, and to sign the contract only then. Unless
such rent seeking is prohibitively costly, the principal must make a trade-oﬀ between
eﬃciency and surplus extraction.
The crucial step is to recognize that precontractual information is relevant for the
agent's expectation of his rent, and thus his willingness to pay participation fees. If
the acquisition entails low costs, so that the contract must anyway be designed almost
as if the agent had the information, it is therefore better to make the terms of trade
contingent on the informationand thus to induce the acquisition. In particular,
if the agent does acquire information, the principal can implement a more eﬃcient
contract menu with a larger participation fee conditional on the agent receiving good
news about his payoﬀ type, and a less eﬃcient menu with a smaller fee in case of bad
news. The corresponding contract screens the agent sequentially, so as to elicit not
just the payoﬀ type but also the posterior belief thereof upon information acquisition.
Of course, precontractual information would be relevant for the agent's expec-
tation of his rent also if the information was perfect, as in CK's analysis. But in
that case, the information would be identical to the one that the agent obtains after
signing, when he ﬁnally learns his payoﬀ type. Hence, a contract that deters the
acquisition could nevertheless condition on the information. This explains why my
result diﬀers from the one by CK.
The paper thus identiﬁes a possible form of ineﬃciency in contracting: before the
unknown state after the signing of the contract fully. The crucial property of CK's model is that
precontractual information is identical to the postcontractual information, whereas I assume that it
is a garbling.
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signing of the contract, parties possibly waste resources to acquire information about
parameters that, after signing, they learn anyway. Even though this act is ineﬃcient,
the social surplus may be larger if the acquisition does take place. Speciﬁcally, in my
model, the principal's best contracts that induce information acquisition implement
diﬀerent, possibly more eﬃcient terms of trade than the best contracts that deter
information acquisition. The exact welfare properties of these contracts highly depend
on the details of the model.
The analysis suggests implications for the use of trial subscriptions as a marketing
device, for example by newspapers. A trial subscription allows consumers to learn
about their valuation before deciding whether to buy a regular subscription. Eﬀec-
tively, such a test has little social value if subscription plans can be canceled at short
notice. But in case that the consumers can easily obtain precontractual informa-
tion anyway, then, according to this paper, a supplier may ﬁnd it optimal to induce
information gatheringfor which free trial subscriptions are an eﬀective means.
A key insight is that the contracting problem is closely related to the ones consid-
ered in the sequential-screening literature (e.g., Courty and Li 2000; Esö and Szentes
2007; Krähmer and Strausz 2015). There, agents gradually receive private informa-
tion over time before the allocation takes place.2 In the seminal paper by Courty
and Li (2000), in particular, the agent exogenously has imperfect information from
the outset and learns his exact payoﬀ type after the signing of the contract. That
setting is equivalent to the special case of my model in which information acqui-
sition entails zero costs.3 For this case, the question of whether optimal contracts
2Another closely related literature considers settings with dynamic adverse selection and multiple
allocations (see, e.g., Battaglini 2005 and Boleslavsky and Said 2013). Occasionally, I refer to both
strands as the dynamic contracting literature. See Pavan et al. (2014) for a uniﬁed framework.
3In Courty and Li's model, the agent receives precontractual information already before the
contract is oﬀered, rather than only before the signing decision. This diﬀerence is irrelevant: in
either case, the agent begins to act with the signing decision. A technical diﬀerence is that Courty
and Li assume a continuum of types whereas I, to facilitate the comparison with CK, assume a ﬁnite
number.
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induce information acquisition can be rephrased as whether they condition on the
informationand thus indeed screen the agent sequentially. Courty and Li provide
a complete characterization of optimal contracts, using regularity assumptions con-
cerning the probability distributions of their model. Under these assumptions, the
optimal contracts do screen sequentially. I focus on the optimality of sequential
screening and verify this property assuming just a ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance
ordering of the posterior distributions. The optimality of sequential screening is also
studied by Krähmer and Strausz (2015). They show that if the agent has the right
to withdraw from the contract when he learns his payoﬀ type, optimal contracts are
static, and only condition on the payoﬀ type.
With nonzero investigation costs, the contracting problem diﬀers from the one in
Courty and Li (2000) by a moral hazard issue. Speciﬁcally, to induce information
acquisition the principal may have to provide extra incentives; contracts that do not
condition on the information, on the other hand, need not be designed as if the
agent had it. The polar case, endogenous postcontractual information, is studied by
Krähmer and Strausz (2011). There, the agent's incentives to acquire information
diﬀer, since he cannot quit the contract afterwards.
Various papers analyze proﬁt-maximizing contracts for related settings in which
an agent can acquire information before signing (see Bergemann and Välimäki 2002
for surplus-maximizing mechanisms in a general mechanism-design framework with
endogenous information). In particular, Crémer et al. (1998a), Lewis and Sappington
(1997), and Szalay (2009) assume that the agent never learns his payoﬀ type for free
(see Shi 2012 for an auction setting). Crémer and Khalil (1994) as well as Crémer et al.
(1998b), on the other hand, consider the case that information gathering must take
place already before the contract is oﬀered, and thus cannot be induced or deterred
by contract design. Finally, Compte and Jehiel (2008) demonstrate that if, in CK's
setting, several agents compete for a single, bilateral contract, the principal possibly
induces information gathering to ﬁnd a suitable candidate.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the model. Sections
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3 and 4 describe the eﬃcient outcome and brieﬂy review CK's result, respectively.
In Section 5, I ﬁrst establish the main result, according to which optimal contracts
may induce information gathering. Afterwards, I study optimal contracts in more
detail and analyze the comparative static. Section 6 concludes. All proofs are in the
appendix.
2 Model
I use a variant of the procurement model by CK. Speciﬁcally, a principal seeks to
purchase some quantity of a good, which an agent can produce. Given output q ≥ 0,
marginal production costs β, and transfer t ∈ R, the agent's payoﬀ is t − βq. The
principal's payoﬀ is V (q)− t, where V is strictly concave, continuously diﬀerentiable,
and satisﬁes limq→0 V ′(q) =∞ and limq→∞ V ′(q) = 0.
Initially, both parties do not know the agent's marginal costs. The common prior
is that β equals βi with probability γ¯(βi) > 0, where i ∈ I := {1, . . . , n}. Suppose
1 < n < ∞, and let 0 < β1 < · · · < βn < ∞. The agent learns the true value
of β before production takes place, but only after the date at which he must decide
whether to accept the contract.
At investigation costs e ≥ 0, the agent can acquire a signal s of β while deliberating
whether to accept. The signal equals sj with unconditional probability pij > 0, where
j ∈ J := {1, . . . ,m}. Signal realization sj gives rise to the posterior probability
γj(βi) of βi. Suppose 1 < m <∞, and let the possible posteriors be ordered in terms
of strict ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance: for every i < n, the cumulative posterior
probability that βi obtains,
Γj(βi) :=
i∑
k=1
γj(βk),
strictly decreases in j. A low signal s thus indicates low costs β.4
4First-order stochastic dominance orderings are common in the dynamic-contracting literature;
see Pavan et al. (2014) for a discussion. The seminal paper by Courty and Li (2000) considers both
ﬁrst- and second-order stochastic dominance.
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A contract stipulates the terms of trade (t, q), possibly contingent on communica-
tion. The principal cannot observe whether the agent acquires the signal. Moreover,
she cannot verify any reports that the agent might submit about his private informa-
tion. To distinguish the two possible pieces of private information, I refer to j ∈ J as
the agent's posterior type and to i ∈ I as his cost type. Finally, I refer to the signal s
as (precontractual) information.
In detail, the timing of the interaction is as follows:
1. Principal oﬀers contract
2. Agent can acquire information
3. Agent must accept or reject contract
4. If contract accepted: agent learns cost type before production takes place
If contract rejected: interaction ends with zero payoﬀs
Importantly, precontractual information is imperfect. Speciﬁcally, let γj(βi) > 0
for all i, j, so that the agent always still deems each cost type possible upon acquiring
information. This is the crucial diﬀerence to the model by CK: there, s equals β, so
that precontractual information reveals the cost type perfectly.5
3 Eﬃciency
From an eﬃciency perspective, the contract should maximize the expected surplus
of the interaction, that is, the expected diﬀerence between V (q) − βq and the in-
curred investigation costs, if any.6 The eﬃcient output level depends on the agent's
production costs and equals qˆ(βi) := V
′−1(βi). Clearly, precontractual information
is redundant, and its acquisition thus socially ineﬃcient, given that the agent learns
his costs anywayperfectly, for free, and before production takes place. I denote the
5The only other diﬀerence between the two models is that (as a consequence) the posteriors are
ordered in terms of weak rather than strict ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance in CK's model. My
results would also hold with a weak ordering, but some derivations would be longer.
6Unless stated diﬀerently, I always mean the expectation based on the prior.
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maximum expected surplus by
Wˆ :=
∑
j
pij
∑
i
γj(βi) [V (qˆ(βi))− βiqˆ(βi)] .
Note that if information acquisition was impossible, the principal could implement
the eﬃcient output level and fully extract all gains from trade, as the agent learns
his production costs only after the signing of the contract.7
4 Benchmark: the case of perfect information
From now on, I study the contracting problem from the perspective of the principal,
who wants to maximize her expected payoﬀ. I focus on the question of whether
optimal contracts induce or deter information acquisition. As a benchmark, I ﬁrst
review the result by CK. They show that if the information is perfect, it cannot be
advantageous to induce the acquisition (see their Lemma 1).
The key insight is that, with perfect information, to each contract that induces in-
formation acquisition there corresponds a contract that does not and that implements
the same terms of trade. To see this, consider a contract that induces information
acquisition. Modify it by allowing the agent to exit once he learns his production
costs exogenously, and by postponing any further choice until after that date. If
precontractual information is perfect, the agent has then the same information as
under the original contract when he decides (ultimately) about his participation and
makes any further choice. By revealed preferences, the modiﬁed contract therefore
implements the same terms of trade as the original one. But the agent has clearly
no incentive to acquire information. This argument implies that for each contract
that induces information acquisition, there exists a contract that does not and that
gives the principal the same expected payoﬀ. CK go further and show that unless the
investigation costs are zero, the principal can in fact do strictly better with contracts
7E.g., this could be achieved with a `sell-the-ﬁrm' contract, which lets the agent choose output
and speciﬁes the transfer tˆ(q) = V (q)− Wˆ .
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that deter information acquisition.
If precontractual information is perfect, it is identical to the information that the
agent obtains after signing. Therefore, a contract that deters the acquisition can
nevertheless condition on the information. With imperfect information, this is clearly
not the case: there, the agent must indeed conduct the acquisition if the terms of
trade are to depend on precontractual information.
5 The case of imperfect information
I now return to the original setting, where precontractual information is imperfect,
and show that the principal may there prefer to induce information acquisition.
5.1 Contracts that deter information acquisition
Invoking the revelation principle for dynamic games (see Myerson 1986), I restrict
attention to direct, incentive-compatible contracts. The contracts that deter infor-
mation acquisition have the form
(t¯, q¯) := (t¯(βk), q¯(βk))k∈I .
Once the agent learns his cost type, he must announce it with a report k ∈ I. Given
the report, the terms of trade are (t¯(βk), q¯(βk)). The contract is incentive-compatible
if and only if the agents ﬁnds it best to dispense with information acquisition and to
report the cost type truthfully.
In detail, the contract must satisfy the following conditions. First (moving back-
wards), the agent must report the cost type truthfully. Using for the agent's payoﬀ
the notation
U¯(βi) := t¯(βi)− βiq¯(βi),
this condition reads
U¯(βi) ≥ U¯(βk) + (βk − βi)q¯(βk) ∀i, k ∈ I. (1)
9
Second, the agent must accept the contract. Since he does not yet know the cost
type when the participation decision is due, this condition only requires that the
contract guarantees him a nonnegative payoﬀ in expectation, rather than for each
particular type. Importantly, the expectation derives from the prior, as the agent is
supposed to dispense with information gathering:∑
j
pij
∑
i
γj(βi)U¯(βi) ≥ 0. (2)
Finally, the agent must indeed not gather information. Precontractual information
is valuable to him if and only if, with some posterior types, the contract yields a
negative expected payoﬀ: if he could update his expectation, he would be able to
avoid a likely loss by rejecting the contract oﬀer. The value of information must be
smaller than the investigation costs:∑
j
pij
∑
i
γj(βi)U¯(βi) ≥
∑
j
pij max
{∑
i
γj(βi)U¯(βi), 0
}
− e. (3)
Consider now the principal's objective. She seeks to maximize her expected payoﬀ.
Thus, the best contracts that deter information acquisition are the solutions to
P¯ : max
(t¯,q¯)
∑
j
pij
∑
i
γj(βi)[V (q¯(βi))− t¯(βi)] s.t. (1)(3).
5.2 Contracts that induce information acquisition
The contracts that induce information acquisition have the form
(t,q) := (tl(βk), ql(βk))k∈I,l∈J .
First, the agent must submit a report l ∈ J about the posterior type. Later on, when
he learns his production costs, he must submit a second report, k ∈ I, this time about
the cost type. The two reports lead to the terms of trade (tl(βk), ql(βk)). A contract
(t,q) is incentive-compatible if and only if the agent prefers to gather information
and to submit two truthful reports.
Since the agent obtains two pieces of private informationﬁrst the posterior type,
later on the cost typehe must also report twice, and is thus screened sequentially.
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Note that if precontractual information was perfect rather than imperfect, so that
posterior and cost type were equivalent, there would be no reason to let the agent
report twice. Indeed, the revelation principle would then demand just one report (to
be submitted before the agent learns his costs exogenously).
In detail, the contract must satisfy the following conditions. First, the agent must
again report the cost type truthfully. Using for the agent's payoﬀ the notation
Uj(βi) := tj(βi)− βiqj(βi),
this condition reads:
Uj(βi) ≥ Uj(βk) + (βk − βi)qj(βi) ∀i, k ∈ I; j ∈ J. (4)
Second, the agent must also report the posterior type truthfully:∑
i
γj(βi)Uj(βi) ≥
∑
i
γj(βi)Ul(βi) ∀j, l ∈ J. (5)
Third, the agent must participate. In contrast to the contracts (t¯, q¯), this condi-
tion requires that the contract is acceptable conditional on the posterior type, rather
than the prior, because the agent is supposed to gather information:∑
i
γj(βi)Uj(βi) ≥ 0 ∀j ∈ J. (6)
Finally, the agent must indeed gather information. Precontractual information
can be valuable to him because it allows to report the posterior type truthfully.8 The
following condition ensures that the value of information is larger than the investiga-
tion costs:∑
j
pij
∑
i
γj(βi)Uj(βi)− e ≥ max
{∑
j
pij
∑
i
γj(βi)Ul(βi), 0
}
∀l ∈ J. (7)
8Without (6), the individual-rationality condition, the information could be valuable also with
respect to the participation decision. Precisely, it would be valuable if and only if the contract
was acceptable with some, but not all posterior types. Requiring individual rationality is as usual
without loss of generality: given any incentive-compatible contract (t′,q′) that is acceptable only
with posterior types j ∈ J ′ ⊂ J , the contract (t′′,q′′) with (t′′l (βk), q′′l (βk))k = (t′l(βk), q′l(βk))k for
all l ∈ J ′ and (t′′l (βk), q′′l (βk))k = (0, 0) for all l /∈ J ′ is incentive-compatible, individually rational,
and implements the same terms of trade.
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The best contracts that induce information acquisition are thus the solutions to
P : max
(t,q)
∑
j
pij
∑
i
γj(βi)[V (qj(βi))− tj(βi)] s.t. (4)(7).
The principal's optimal contracts, ﬁnally, can be found as follows: First, derive the
best contracts that deter and induce information acquisition, respectively.9 Second,
maximize over this binary choice.
5.3 Information gathering for rent-seeking purposes
I now show that unless information gathering is prohibitively costly, the principal
must make a trade-oﬀ between eﬃciency and surplus extraction to design an optimal
contract. So suppose she chooses to deter the acquisition of the socially useless
information. The following lemma simpliﬁes the relevant conditions.
Lemma 1. Among the contracts (t¯, q¯), for each contract that satisﬁes (1)(3) there
is a contract with identical expected payoﬀs for both parties that satisﬁes
q¯(βi)− q¯(βi+1) ≥ 0 ∀i < n (8)∑
j
pij
[
U¯(βn) +
n−1∑
i=1
Γj(βi)(βi+1 − βi)q¯(βi+1)
]
≥ 0 (9)
m∑
j=l
pij
[
U¯(βn) +
n−1∑
i=1
Γj(βi)(βi+1 − βi)q¯(βi+1)
]
+ e ≥ 0 ∀l ∈ {2, . . . ,m} (10)
together with
U¯(βi)− U¯(βi+1) = (βi+1 − βi) q¯(βi+1) ∀i < n. (11)
Moreover, (8)(11) imply (1)(3).
According to (11), the agent earns an extra payoﬀ for not exaggerating his pro-
duction costs. By (8), on the other hand, reporting lower costs obliges to produce
9The existence of these contracts follows from standard existence theorems for convex optimiza-
tion problems and is not proved here.
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more output. These two, standard conditions make sure that the agent reports his
cost type truthfully.
(9) is the participation condition. Note that by (11), the agent's payoﬀ with cost
type i equals
U¯(βn) +
n−1∑
k=i
(βi+1 − βi)q¯(βi+1).
I refer to the summand on the right-hand side as the agent's rent with cost type i,
and to −U¯(βn) as a participation fee. The agent ﬁnds the contract acceptable if and
only if, conditional on the prior, the participation fee does not exceed the expected
rent.
(10), ﬁnally, guarantees that the agent does not gather information. Precontrac-
tual information is valuable to the agent if and only if the participation fee exceeds
the expected rent conditional on some posterior types. To understand the condition,
note that the rent is larger the lower the cost type. By the ﬁrst-order stochastic
dominance ordering of the posteriors, the expected rent is thus larger the lower the
posterior type. This implies that if the participation fee exceeds the expected rent
with some posterior type l, then so it does for all types j > l.
Condition (11) can be inserted directly into the principal's objective function,
which I now write as the diﬀerence between expected surplus and expected payoﬀ to
the agent:
∆¯ :=
∑
j
pij
∑
i
γj(βi)[V (q¯(βi))− βiq¯(βi)]
−
∑
j
pij
[
U¯(βn) +
n−1∑
i=1
Γj(βi)(βi+1 − βi)q¯(βi+1)
]
.
Note that by (11), the transfers are pinned down by the output schedule up to the
participation fee. I may therefore regard contracts that deter information acquisition
alternatively as combinations (−U¯(βn), q¯) of participation fee and output schedule.
The best contract, denoted by (−U¯∗(βn), q¯∗), is the unique solution to
P¯ : max
(−U¯(βn),q¯)
∆¯ s.t. (8)(10).
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I can now show that the agent's possibility to gather information for rent-seeking
purposes may force the principal to make a trade-oﬀ between eﬃciency and surplus
extraction. Suppose information acquisition was impossible. In that case, condition
(10) could be ignored. Clearly, the principal would implement the eﬃcient output
schedule, q¯ = qˆ, and fully extract all gains from trade with a participation fee equal
to the agent's expected rent,
−U¯(βn) = −Uˆ(βn) :=
∑
j
pij
n−1∑
i=1
Γj(βi)(βi+1 − βi)qˆ(βi+1).
The main result of this section is that this contract may violate condition (10):
Proposition 1. There exists a cutoﬀ level of investigation costs eˆ > 0 such that
(−Uˆ(βn), qˆ) satisﬁes (10) if and only if e ≥ eˆ.
Since the participation fee −Uˆ(βn) equals the expected rent conditional on the
prior, it must exceed it conditional on some posterior types. Hence, precontractual
information is valuable to the agent. The described contract satisﬁes (10), the no-
information-acquisition condition, thus only for high investigation costs.
By acquiring information, the agent has the costly option to check his payoﬀ from
the contract before deciding whether to accept it. Proposition 1 says that unless
this rent-seeking activity is prohibitively costly, the principal must make a trade-
oﬀ between eﬃciency and surplus extraction to ﬁnd an optimal contract. I now
demonstrate that it can then be advantageous to make the terms of trade contingent
on the informationand thus to induce the acquisition.
5.4 Use of contracts that induce information acquisition
This section presents the main result of the paper, according to which the principal
may prefer to induce information acquisition. In the remaining analysis, I denote by
W¯ (e) andW (e) the principal's expected payoﬀ from the best contracts that deter and
induce information acquisition, respectively, depending on the investigation costs.
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My derivation will not involve a full characterization of these best contracts. In
particular, I will not provide an analog of Lemma 1 and simplify the conditions that
the contracts that induce information acquisition must satisfy. This is because, as
is well known in the literature on dynamic contracting with exogenous information,
truthtelling conditions for sequential-screening contracts generally lack useful char-
acterizations (see, e.g., Pavan et al. 2014). The usual approach is to make stringent
regularity assumptions that allow to focus on a relaxed problem (see Battaglini and
Lamba 2015 for details and a discussion). Speciﬁcally, the assumptions would con-
cern the probability distributions of the model, and thus the quality of precontractual
information. I omit them because my result holds generally with imperfect informa-
tion. In fact, in the present setting, a characterization of the best sequential-screening
contracts (t,q) would entail additional complications, given that precontractual in-
formation is endogenous.10
I start with a partial comparison.
Lemma 2. The functions W¯ and W have the following properties:
1. W¯ is nondecreasing and W nonincreasing;
2. they are continuous;
3. they have a unique intersection.
The ﬁrst and the last statement are intuitive: Contracts that induce information
acquisition have two disadvantages. First, they must satisfy a more restrictive par-
ticipation condition. Speciﬁcally, they must be proﬁtable for the agent conditional
on the posterior type, whereas a contract that deters the acquisition only needs to be
proﬁtable conditional on the prior, as long as the value of information does not ex-
ceed the investigation costs. The second disadvantage is that information acquisition
must be incentive-compatible, to compensate the agent for the investigation costs.11
Now, these disadvantages are less substantial the lower the investigation costs. In
10Section 5.5 gives a characterization for the special case of binary posterior and cost types.
11Hence, W (e) ≤ Wˆ − e for all e, whereas by Proposition 1 W¯ (e) = Wˆ for e ≥ eˆ.
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particular, if e = 0, the agent eﬀectively has precontractual information anyway. In
fact, in that case, the only diﬀerence between the contracts (t¯, q¯) and (t,q) is that
the latter ones allow to make the terms of trade contingent on the information.
The key step is now to recognize that if information acquisition entails zero costs,
so that the contract must anyway be designed as if the agent had the information, it
is strictly optimal to make the terms of trade contingent:
Lemma 3. W (0) > W¯ (0).
Remark 1. If information acquisition entails zero costs, the contracting problem is in
fact equivalent to the one considered in the seminal paper on sequential screening by
Courty and Li (2000), where the agent exogenously has imperfect information from
the outset. Courty and Li provide a complete characterization of optimal contracts,
using regularity assumptions. Under these assumptions, the optimal contracts in their
model also condition on the information.
In the following, I give a detailed illustration of the lemma for the case of binary
posterior and cost types (m = n = 2). I refer to j = 1, 2 as the optimistic and
the pessimistic posterior type, respectively, and write j = O,P . Consider ﬁrst the
contracts that deter information acquisition. As in the previous section, I regard
them as combinations (−U¯(β2), q¯) of participation fee and output schedule. The
agent earns a rent of (β2 − β1)q¯(β2) if he has low production costs, and no rent in
case of high costs. Conditional on posterior type j, his expected payoﬀ is thus
U¯(β2) + γj(β1)(β2 − β1)q¯(β2).
Now, since information gathering entails zero costs, the contract must be accept-
able for each posterior type. With the optimistic type, however, the agent is more
conﬁdent to earn the rent: γO(β1) > γP (β1). Hence, the principal cannot extract the
expected rent fullyan illustration of Proposition 1. As a consequence, the best con-
tract that deters information acquisition stipulates an ineﬃciently low output level
q¯(β2).
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The key insight is that the terms of trade should never be distorted for both
posterior types in this fashion. With the optimistic type, the agent has a larger
valuation for rent, given that he is more conﬁdent to earn it. Hence, ifwith the
optimistic typehe was to produce eﬃciently and pay an extra participation fee that
fully extracts the extra expected rent, whereaswith the pessimistic typehe was
to stick with the original contract, he would comply.
In detail, suppose the agent can choose among the best contract that deters in-
formation acquisition, (−U¯∗(β2), q¯∗), and a contract (−U¯ ′(β2), q¯′) which only diﬀers
in that q¯′(β2) = qˆ(β2) and
−U¯ ′(β2) = −U¯∗(β2) + γO(β1)(β2 − β1) [qˆ(β2)− q¯∗(β2)] .
Under the alternative contract, the agent thus produces eﬃciently, and hence earns
an extra rent. However, he must also pay an extra participation fee, which equals the
extra expected rent conditional on the optimistic posterior type. With that type, he
would consequently be indiﬀerent, and thus willing to choose the alternative contract:
U¯ ′(β2) + γO(β1)(β2 − β1)q¯′(β2)
= U¯∗(β2)− γO(β1)(β2 − β1) [qˆ(β2)− q¯∗(β2)] + γO(β1)(β2 − β1)qˆ(β2)
= U¯∗(β2) + γO(β1)(β2 − β1)q¯∗(β2).
With the pessimistic type, in contrast, the agent would stick with the original con-
tract, given that he is less conﬁdent to earn the extra rent:
U¯ ′(β2) + γP (β1)(β2 − β1)q¯′(β2)
= U¯∗(β2)− γO(β1)(β2 − β1) [qˆ(β2)− q¯∗(β2)] + γP (β1)(β2 − β1)qˆ(β2)
< U¯∗(β2)− γP (β1)(β2 − β1) [qˆ(β2)− q¯∗(β2)] + γP (β1)(β2 − β1)qˆ(β2)
= U¯∗(β2) + γP (β1)(β2 − β1)q¯∗(β2).
Clearly, this scheme amounts to a contract (t,q) that generates strictly more
expected surplus than the best contract that deters information acquisition but pro-
vides the agent with the same expected payoﬀ. The proof extends the reasoning to
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the original model, where the numbers of posterior and cost types are arbitrary, and
shows that the principal can strictly improve over the best contract that deters infor-
mation acquisition with a contract (t,q) that exhibits `no distortion at the top', that
is, which implements the eﬃcient output schedule if the agent has the posterior type
j = 1.12
Thus, if information gathering entails zero costs, so that the contract must anyway
be designed as if the agent had the information, it is strictly optimal to make the
terms of trade contingent because the information determines the agent's expectation
of the rent that he will earn, and hence his willingness to pay participation fees.
Lemmas 2 and 3 directly imply the main result of the paper. Of course, it would
be best if the agent could not obtain precontractual information at all. But given
that he has this possibility, it can be advantageous not to deter the acquisition:
Theorem 1. There exists a cutoﬀ level of investigation costs e¯ > 0 such that
• if e < e¯, optimal contracts induce information acquisition (W (e) > W¯ (e));
• if e > e¯, optimal contracts deter information acquisition (W (e) < W¯ (e)).
5.5 Characterizations and comparisons
To study the optimal contracts in more detail, I restrict attention from now on to the
case of binary posterior and cost types. The present section fully characterizes and
compares the best contracts that deter and induce information acquisition, respec-
tively. In the following, I use the notation
φ := piOpiP [γO(β1)− γP (β1)] (β2 − β1).
12The reasoning is reminiscent of Battaglini (2005). In a setting with multiple allocations, dy-
namic adverse selection, and binary states, he shows that once the agent reports for the ﬁrst time to
be in the `good' state, all subsequent allocations are eﬃcient (his `generalized no-distortion-at-the-
top principle'). The reasoning might suggest that given e = 0, optimal contracts generally implement
more eﬃcient output levels the lower the posterior type. Results from the dynamic-contracting lit-
erature show that this is not the case: distortions in optimal contracts highly depend on the details
of the model (see in particular Battaglini and Lamba 2015).
18
Consider ﬁrst the contracts that deter information acquisition. They are stud-
ied in detail by CK, whose results easily extend to imperfect information. For the
characterization, let
q¯A(β2) := V
′−1
(
β2 +
piO[γO(β1)− γP (β1)](β2 − β1)
piOγO(β2) + piPγP (β2)
)
−U¯A(β2) := γP (β1)(β2 − β1)q¯A(β2) + e
piP
eA := φqA(β2)
q¯B(β2) :=
e
φ
−U¯B(β2) := γP (β1)(β2 − β1)q¯B(β2) + e
piP
eˆ := φqˆ(β2)
Proposition 2. The best contract that deters information acquisition is given as
follows:
• if e ≤ eA, then (−U¯∗(β2), q¯∗) = (−U¯A(β2), qˆ(β1), q¯A(β2));
• if e ∈ (eA, eˆ), then (−U¯∗(β2), q¯∗) = (−U¯B(β2), qˆ(β1), q¯B(β2));
• if e ≥ eˆ, then (−U¯∗(β2), q¯∗) = (−Uˆ(β2), qˆ).
Proposition 1 already established that if the investigation costs are high enough
(e ≥ eˆ), the principal can implement the eﬃcient output schedule and fully extract
the agent's expected rent. For lower investigation costs, this is not feasible, as the
agent would gather information before deciding whether to accept. Speciﬁcally, (10),
the no-information-acquisition condition, binds. The principal can then only extract
the expected rent conditional on the pessimistic posterior type, plus a markup pro-
portional to the investigation costs. As the surplus that she can not extract depends
on the output level q¯(β2), she chooses this output level ineﬃciently low. Speciﬁcally,
for e < eA she chooses the same level that would be optimal if the agent knew his
posterior type. For e ∈ (eA, eˆ), the participation condition binds as well, and q¯(β2)
increases with e to the eﬃcient level.
Consider now the contracts that induce information acquisition. Analogously to
Lemma 1, I ﬁrst simplify the relevant conditions.
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Lemma 4. Among the contracts (t,q), for each contract that satisﬁes (4)(7) there
is a contract with identical expected payoﬀs for both parties that satisﬁes
qj(β1)− qj(β2) ≥ 0 ∀j = O,P (12)
UP (β2) + γP (β1)(β2 − β1)qP (β2) ≥ 0 (13)
φ [qO(β1)− qP (β2)]− e ≥ 0 (14)
together with
UO(β1)− UO(β2) = (β2 − β1)qO(β1) (15)
UP (β1)− UP (β2) = (β2 − β1)qP (β2) (16)
UO(β2)− UP (β2) = −γO(β1)(β2 − β1) [qO(β1)− qP (β2)] + e
piO
. (17)
Moreover, (12)(17) imply (4)(7).
(12), (15), and (16) together ensure that the agent reports his production costs
truthfully. As with the contracts that deter information acquisition, this requires that
the agent earns a rent in case that the production costs are low. The agent's expected
payoﬀ thus again equals the diﬀerence between expected rent and participation fee.
However, both rent and fee now depend on the posterior type.
(13) is the participation condition. By incentive-compatibility, it suﬃces that the
agent ﬁnds the contract proﬁtable if he has the pessimistic posterior type, with which
he is less conﬁdent to earn rent.
(14) and (17), ﬁnally, together ensure that the agent acquires information and
reports the posterior type truthfully.13 Speciﬁcally, (17) requires an extra payoﬀ for
the optimistic type that, in particular, compensates for the investigation costs. Any
extra expected rent that this type earns with his terms of trade, however, can be
extracted with an extra participation fee of
γO(β1)(β2 − β1) [qO(β1)− qP (β2)] ,
13It is a special feature of the case of binary posterior types that the information-acquisition
condition, (7), implies the truthtelling condition (5).
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as illustrated in the previous section. (14) requires extra output, to rule out that the
agent pretends to have the optimistic type. Note that extra payoﬀ and output increase
in the investigation costs. This is a common feature of contracts with endogenous
information (see in particular Lewis and Sappington 1997, who coined the term super
high-powered incentive scheme, and the general analysis by Szalay 2009).
Conditions (15)(17) can be inserted directly into the objective function, which
I now write as the diﬀerence between expected surplus and expected payoﬀ to the
agent:
∆ :=
∑
j
pij
∑
i
γj(βi) [V (qj(βi))− βiqj(βi)]− e
−
∑
j
pij [UP (β2) + γj(β1)(β2 − β1)qP (β2)] .
Note that by (15)(17), the transfers are pinned down by the output schedules up to
the participation fee for the pessimistic posterior type. I may therefore regard con-
tracts that induce information acquisition alternatively as combinations (−UP (β2),q)
of this participation fee and the menu of output schedules. The best contract, denoted
by (−U∗P (β2),q∗), is the unique solution to
P : max
(−Up(β2),q)
∆ s.t. (12)(14).
The best contract is characterized in Proposition 3 below. To state the result, let
qCP (β2) := V
′−1
(
β2 +
piO [γO(β1)− γP (β1)] (β2 − β1)
piPγP (β2)
)
−UCP (β2) := γP (β1)(β2 − β1)qCP (β2)
eC := φ[qˆ(β1)− qCP (β2)],
deﬁne qDP (β2) by
piOγO(β1)V
′
(
qDP (β2) +
e
φ
)
+ piPγP (β2)V
′(qDP (β2))
= piOγO(β1)β1 + piPγP (β2)β2 + piO[γO(β1)− γP (β1)](β2 − β1),
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and let
qDO (β1) := q
D
P (β2) +
e
φ
−UDP (β2) := γP (β1)(β2 − β1)qDP (β2).
Proposition 3. The best contract that induces information acquisition is given as
follows:
• if e ≤ eC, then (−U∗P (β2),q∗) = (−UCP (β2), qˆO(β1), qˆO(β2), qˆP (β1), qCP (β2));
• if e > eC, then (−U∗P (β2),q∗) = (−UDP (β2), qDO (β1), qˆO(β2), qˆP (β1), qDP (β2)).
The principal chooses the participation fee −UP (β2) as large as possible, and thus
equal to the expected rent conditional on the pessimistic posterior type. As described
above, she can furthermore appropriate the extra expected rent that the optimistic
type earns with his terms of trade. The surplus that the principal can not extract
depends consequently only on the terms of trade for the pessimistic type, precisely,
on the output level qP (β2). Now, if the investigation costs are low, the principal need
not distort the contract in order to induce information acquisition. Therefore, she
stipulates qP (β2) ineﬃciently low and otherwise requires eﬃcient production. For high
e, on the other hand, the information-acquisition condition (14) binds. The principal
then raises qO(β1) above the eﬃcient level and further reduces qP (β2), to implement
the extra output that (14) requires.
Observe that even though information acquisition is ineﬃcient, the best contract
that induces information acquisition may result in a larger expected surplus than the
best contract that deters this act. This is because it implements diﬀerent, possibly
more eﬃcient output levels. For illustration, suppose the investigation costs are zero:
in that case, the potential welfare gain must be maximal. The diﬀerence in expected
surplus between the two contracts equals then
piOγO(β2)
[
V (qˆ(β2))− β2qˆ(β2)−
(
V (q¯A(β2))− β2q¯A(β2)
)]
+ piPγP (β2)
[
V (qCP (β2))− β2qCP (β2)−
(
V (q¯A(β2))− β2q¯A(β2)
)]
.
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The ﬁrst line is positive: With contracts that induce information acquisition, the
principal can fully extract any extra expected rent that the optimistic posterior type
earns with his terms of trade, and therefore she sets qO(β2) to the eﬃcient level. With
contracts that deter information acquisition, in contrast, she chooses q¯(β2) ineﬃciently
low. The second line is negative: With contracts that induce information acquisition,
the surplus that the principal cannot extract depends on the output level qP (β2),
whereas with contracts that deter information acquisition, it depends on q¯(β2). As
qP (β2) only applies to the pessimistic posterior type, the principal distorts it even
more than q¯(β2). One can easily verify that the overall expression is strictly positive
if, for example, the optimistic posterior type has a suﬃciently high probability (i.e.,
if piO is large).
5.6 Comparative static
According to the present paper, the principal may induce information acquisition if the
information is imperfect. CK, on the other hand, demonstrate that the acquisition
of perfect information will be deterred. In view of this contrast, I now study the
comparative static when the information becomes more precise.
Let I := 〈(pij)j, ((γj(βi))i,j〉 be an information structure. I deﬁne increased pre-
cision in terms of Blackwell suﬃciency (see Blackwell and Girshick 1954, Ch. 12.5).
Speciﬁcally, given two information structures I ′, I ′′, I say that precontractual infor-
mation is more precise under I ′′ than under I ′ if and only if
γ′′O(β1) ≥ γ′O(β1), γ′′P (β2) ≥ γ′P (β2),
and, for both cost types i = 1, 2,∑
j
pi′′j γ
′′
j (βi) =
∑
j
pi′jγ
′
j(βi).
With more precise information, the posterior probabilities of the two cost types are
thus more extreme, whereas the prior probabilities remain unchanged.
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I study the eﬀect of increased precision on W (e) − W¯ (e), the payoﬀ diﬀerence
between the best contracts that induce and deter information acquisition, respectively.
The following proposition says that in the limit, when precontractual information
becomes arbitrarily precise (i.e., perfect), CK's result obtains, according to which it
cannot be advantageous to induce information acquisition.
Proposition 4. Let (Iτ )τ≥0 be a sequence of information structures such that if
τ ′′ > τ ′, precontractual information is more precise under Iτ ′′ than under Iτ ′, and
lim γO,τ (β1) = lim γP,τ (β2) = 1. Then, limWτ (0) − W¯τ (0) = 0 and limWτ (e) −
W¯τ (e) < 0 for e > 0.
The proposition follows from the insights of the previous section. With contracts
that deter information acquisition, the surplus that the principal cannot extract de-
pends on the output level q¯(β2), which applies to both posterior types. With contracts
that induce information acquisition, in contrast, it depends on qP (β2), which only ap-
plies to the pessimistic type. In the limit, this diﬀerence is irrelevant, as γO(β2)→ 0.
More generally, when precontractual information becomes arbitrarily precise, it be-
comes identical to the information that the agent obtains after signing. Contracts
that deter information acquisition can therefore implement the same terms of trade
as contracts that induce information acquisition.
Apart from the limit, contracts that induce information acquisition may become
more advantageous with more precise information. For illustration, suppose the in-
vestigation costs are below the cutoﬀs eA and eC from Propositions 2 and 3. Then,
W¯ (e) = max
q¯
∑
j
pij
∑
i
γj(βi) [V (q¯(βi))− βiq¯(βi)] + e
piP
− piO [γO(β1)− γP (β1)] (β2 − β1)q¯(β2)
and
W (e) = max
q
∑
j
pij
∑
i
γj(βi) [V (qj(βi))− βiqj(βi)]− e
− piO [γO(β1)− γP (β1)] (β2 − β1)qP (β2).
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If precontractual information gets more precise, the principal has to leave more surplus
to the agent per unit q¯(β2) and qP (β2), respectively, as the term piO[γO(β1)− γP (β1)]
increases. This is intuitive: if precontractual information was not availableor pure
noisethe principal could fully extract all gains from trade. Now, as explained above,
the optimal output level qP (β2) is smaller than the optimal q¯(β2), since it applies only
to the pessimistic posterior type. The following example shows thatW (e)−W¯ (e) may
therefore locally increase in the precision, and even change sign. Note that the cutoﬀ
e¯ in Theorem 1, at which the principal switches from a contract that induces to one
that deters information acquisition, may thus also locally increase in the precision.
Example 1. For V (q) = 100
√
q, β1 = 1, β2 = 2, and e = 2, let I ′ be characterized by
(pi′O, γ
′
O(β1), γ
′
P (β2)) = (0.5, 0.6, 0.6) and I ′′ by (pi′′O, γ′′O(β1), γ′′P (β2)) = (0.5, 0.8, 0.8).
Then, precontractual information is more precise under I ′′ than under I ′, butW ′(e)−
W¯ ′(e) ≈ −3 whereas W ′′(e)− W¯ ′′(e) ≈ 2.
6 Conclusion
This paper oﬀers a new perspective on information gathering for rent-seeking purposes
in contracting. Of course, it is best for a principal if the agent obtains all private
information only after accepting a contract. But if the agent can acquire information
in advance, while deliberating whether to accept, the principal may not deter the
acquisition. A key insight is that situations with pre-and postcontractual private
information are generally instances of sequential-screening problems.
In this paper, the agent learns his payoﬀ type after the signing of the contract
exogenously. In many situations, a principal can disclose some source of private
information to an agent. The recent literature on disclosure rules in optimal auc-
tions, for example, considers auction settings in which an auctioneer can disclose,
without observing, information to bidders that is relevant for their valuations (see,
e.g., Bergemann and Pesendorfer 2007; Esö and Szentes 2007; Li and Shi 2015). In
such situations, an agent's possibility to gather information for rent-seeking purposes
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might aﬀect both the design of the contract and the disclosure rule. This could be a
topic for future research.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
By standard arguments (see, e.g., Laﬀont and Martimort 2002, Ch. 3.1), (1) is equiv-
alent to
U¯(βi)− U¯(βi+1) ∈ [(βi+1 − βi) q¯(βi+1), (βi+1 − βi) q¯(βi)] ∀i < n (A.1)
together with the monotonicity condition (8). To proceed with the proof, I establish
the following two lemmas. The ﬁrst one allows to simplify (3).
Lemma A1. Given (A.1), (8), and (2), condition (3) holds if and only if
m∑
j=l
pij
∑
i
γj(βi)U¯(βi) + e ≥ 0 ∀l ∈ {2, . . . ,m}. (A.2)
Proof. Note ﬁrst that (A.1) and (8) together imply that U¯(βi) is decreasing in i
and hence, by the ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance ordering of the posteriors, that∑
i γj(βi)U¯(βi) is decreasing in j. Note also that, thus, a necessary condition for (2)
is
∑
i γ1(βi)U¯(βi) ≥ 0.
Now, suppose (A.1), (8), and (2) hold but (3) not. Then, there is a posterior type
l ∈ {2, . . . ,m} such that
0 >
∑
j
pij min
{
0,
∑
i
γj(βi)U¯(βi)
}
+ e =
m∑
j=l
pij
∑
i
γj(βi)U¯(βi) + e.
Hence, (A.2) does not hold. Suppose next that (A.1), (8), and (2) hold but (A.2)
not. Let l ∈ {2, . . . ,m} be the smallest posterior type such that ∑i γj(βi)U¯(βi) < 0.
Then,
0 >
m∑
j=l
pij
∑
i
γj(βi)U¯i + e =
∑
j
pij min
{
0,
∑
i
γj(βi)U¯(βi)
}
+ e.
Hence, condition (3) does not hold.
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Next, I show that (A.1) can without loss of generality be replaced by the stronger
condition (11), and consequently (2) by (9) and (A.2) by (10). This will conclude the
proof of Lemma 1.
Lemma A2. Among the contracts (t¯, q¯), for each contract that satisﬁes (A.1), (8),
(2), and (A.2) there is a contract with identical expected payoﬀs for both parties that
satisﬁes (8)(11).
Proof. Let (t¯′, q¯′) be any contract that satisﬁes (A.1), (8), (2), and (A.2). For a given
cost type k < n, deﬁne
 := U¯ ′(βk)− U¯ ′(βk+1)− (βk+1 − βk) q¯′(βk+1).
Consider the alternative contract (t¯′′, q¯′′), which diﬀers from (t¯′, q¯′) only with respect
to transfers, namely such that
t¯′′(βi) =
t¯
′(βi) +
∑
j pijΓj(βk)−  if i ∈ {1, . . . , k}
t¯′(βi) +
∑
j pijΓj(βk) if i ∈ {k + 1, . . . , n}.
Given these transfers, the alternative contract satisﬁes
U¯ ′′(βk)− U¯ ′′(βk+1) = (βk+1 − βk)q¯′′(βk+1),
and the other payoﬀ diﬀerences are as under the original contract,
U¯ ′′(βi)− U¯ ′′(βi+1) = U¯ ′(βi)− U¯ ′(βi+1) ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1} \ k.
Moreover, ∑
j
pij
∑
i
γj(βi)t¯
′′(βi) =
∑
j
pij
∑
i
γj(βi)t¯
′(βi),
so the alternative contract results in identical expected payoﬀs for both parties as the
original one. Note that this implies that the alternative contract satisﬁes condition
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(2). Finally, for every posterior type l ∈ {2, . . . ,m} it holds that
m∑
j=l
pij
∑
i
γj(βi)U¯
′′(βi) + e
=
m∑
j=l
pij
[∑
i
γj(βi)U¯
′(βi) +
∑
j
pijΓj(βk)− Γj(βk)
]
+ e
=
m∑
j=l
pij
∑
i
γj(βi)U¯
′(βi) +
m∑
j=l
pij
∑
j
pijΓj(βk)−
m∑
j=l
pijΓj(βk)+ e
≥
m∑
j=l
pij
∑
i
γj(βi)U¯
′(βi) + e
≥ 0,
where the ﬁrst inequality follows from the ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance ordering
of the posteriors and the second one from the hypothesis that the original contract
satisﬁes (A.2). Thus, the alternative contract also satisﬁes (A.2).
Repeating the argument for each k < n establishes Lemma A2.
Proof of Proposition 1
The ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance ordering of the posteriors implies that
n−1∑
i=1
Γj(βi)(βi+1 − βi)qˆ(βi+1)
strictly decreases in j. Hence, there are posterior types l ∈ {2, . . . ,m} with
Uˆ(βn) +
n−1∑
i=1
Γj(βi)(βi+1 − βi)qˆ(βi+1) < 0.
Let l∗ be the smallest such l. Then, (10) holds if and only if
e ≥ eˆ := −
m∑
j=l∗
pij
[
Uˆ(βn) +
n−1∑
i=1
Γj(βi)(βi+1 − βi)qˆ(βi+1)
]
> 0.
Proof of Lemma 2
Formally, W¯ and W are the value functions of the optimization problems P¯ (or P¯)
and P , respectively, for the parameter e ≥ 0. That these functions are nondecreasing
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and nonincreasing, respectively, follows from the fact that if e increases, the choice sets
in P¯ and P become larger and smaller, respectively, whereas the objective functions
do not vary with e.
To prove continuity, I use the fact that if a problem has a concave objective
function and quasiconcave constraint functions, then its value function is concave
(e.g., de la Fuente 2000, Thm. 2.12, p. 313). A concave function is continuous on
the interior of its domain. Now, P¯ and P have concave objective and aﬃne, hence
quasiconcave, constraint functions. Note that this would also be the case if e ∈ R
rather than e ≥ 0. The such extended value functions would thus be concave, hence
continuous, on R. So W¯ and W are continuous on their domain, R≥0.
To prove that these functions have a unique intersection, I ﬁrst show that intersec-
tions exist. At e = 0, to every contract (t¯, q¯) that satisﬁes (1)(3) there corresponds
a contract (t,q) that satisﬁes (4)(7) with
(tl(βk), ql(βk))k = (t¯(βk), q¯(βk))k ∀l ∈ J.
Thus, W (0) ≥ W¯ (0). Deﬁne e˜ := Wˆ − W¯ (0), and note that W (e) ≤ Wˆ − e for
all e. Since W¯ is nondecreasing, W (e˜) ≤ W¯ (e˜). Since W and W¯ are furthermore
continuous, the intermediate value theorem implies that intersections exist.
To see that there is just one intersection, note ﬁrst that W¯ (e) = Wˆ for e ≥ eˆ by
Proposition 1, so every intersection must lie in [0, eˆ). Now, since W¯ is concave, it is
diﬀerentiable almost everywhere. At points where the derivative exists, it holds that
dW¯ (e)
de
=
m∑
j=2
κj,
where κj , j = 2, . . . ,m, are nonnegative Lagrange multipliers associated to condition
(10). Again by Proposition 1, for e ∈ [0, eˆ) at least one multiplier is strictly positive.
Being continuous, W¯ must hence be strictly increasing on [0, eˆ). This implies that
there is just one intersection, given that W is nonincreasing.
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Proof of Lemma 3
Consider ﬁrst the contracts that deter information acquisition. The following lemma
says that the best contractthe solution (−U∗(βn), q¯∗) to P¯exhibits downward
distortions for all cost types except the lowest one.
Lemma A3. If e = 0, then q¯∗(βi) < qˆ(βi) for all i ∈ {2, . . . ,m} and q¯∗(β1) = qˆ(β1).
Proof. If e = 0, then, by the ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance ordering of the posteri-
ors, (10) holds if and only if
U¯(βn) +
n−1∑
i=1
Γm(βi)(βi+1 − βi)q¯(βi+1) ≥ 0.
Clearly, this condition implies (9) and holds with equality at the optimum. P¯ can
thus be restated as
max
q¯
∑
j
pij
∑
i
γj(βi)[V (q¯(βi))− βiq¯(βi)]
−
m−1∑
j=1
pij
n−1∑
i=1
[Γj(βi)− Γm(βi)] (βi+1 − βi)q¯(βi+1) s.t. (8).
Let µ(βi), i < n, be nonnegative Lagrange multipliers associated to (8). Then,
q¯∗(βn) ∈ argmax
q¯
∑
j
pijγj(βn) [V (q¯)− βnq¯]
−
m−1∑
j=1
pij [Γj(βn−1)− Γm(βn−1)] (βn − βn−1)q¯
+ µ(βn−1) [q¯∗(βn−1)− q¯] .
For all cost types i ∈ {2, . . . , n− 1},
q¯∗(βi) ∈ argmax
q¯
∑
j
pijγj(βi) [V (q¯)− βiq¯]
−
m−1∑
j=1
pij [Γj(βi−1)− Γm(βi−1)] (βi − βi−1)q¯
+ µ(βi) [q¯ − q¯∗(βi+1)] + µ(βi−1) [q¯∗(βi−1)− q¯] .
30
Finally,
q¯∗(β1) ∈ argmax
q¯
∑
j
pijγj(β1) [V (q¯)− β1q¯] + µ(β1) [q¯ − q¯∗(β2)] .
It follows that q¯∗(βn) < qˆ(βn). For i ∈ {2, . . . , n− 1}, suppose q¯∗(βi+1) < qˆ(βi+1).
If µ(βi) = 0, then q¯
∗(βi) < qˆ(βi). If µ(βi) > 0, complementary slackness implies
q¯∗(βi) = q¯∗(βi+1), so q¯∗(βi) < qˆ(βi) by the induction hypothesis. Finally, q¯∗(β2) <
qˆ(β2) implies µ(β1) = 0, so q¯
∗(β1) = qˆ(β1).
Turn now to the contracts that induce information acquisition. I ﬁrst replace
(4)(7) by suﬃcient alternative conditions. Afterwards, I construct a contract that
satisﬁes these conditions and improves over the best contract that deters information
acquisition.
By standard arguments, (4) is equivalent to the monotonicity condition
qj(βi)− qj(βi+1) ≥ 0 ∀j ∈ J ; i < n (A.3)
together with
Uj(βi)− Uj(βi+1) ∈ [(βi+1 − βi) qj(βi+1), (βi+1 − βi) qj(βi)] ∀j ∈ J ; i < n.
I replace (4) by (A.3) and
Uj(βi)− Uj(βi+1) = (βi+1 − βi) qj(βi+1) ∀j ∈ J ; i < n. (A.4)
The truthtelling condition (5) then reads
Uj(βn) +
n−1∑
i=1
Γj(βi)(βi+1 − βi)qj(βi+1)
≥ Ul(βn) +
n−1∑
i=1
Γj(βi)(βi+1 − βi)ql(βi+1) ∀j, l ∈ J,
(A.5)
and the participation condition, (6),
Uj(βn) +
n−1∑
i=1
Γj(βi)(βi+1 − βi)qj(βi+1) ≥ 0 ∀j ∈ J. (A.6)
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The information-acquisition condition, (7), is implied by (5) and (6) at e = 0.
Note that by (A.4), the transfers are for each posterior type j pinned down
by that type's output schedule up to the constant −Uj(βn). I therefore re-
gard contracts that induce information acquisition in this proof as combinations
(−U1(βn), . . . ,−Um(βn),q), the relevant conditions being (A.3), (A.5), and (A.6).
Consider the contract (−U ′1(βn), . . . ,−U ′m(βn),q′), designed as follows. For all
posterior types j ∈ {2, . . . ,m},
(q′j(βi))i = (q¯
∗(βi))i
−U ′j(βn) = −U¯∗(βn),
that is, the agent produces according to the same output schedule as under the best
contract that deters information acquisition, (−U¯∗(βn), q¯∗), and also gets the same
expected payoﬀ. For posterior type j = 1, on the other hand,
(q′1(βi))i = (qˆ(βi))i
−U ′1(βn) = −U¯∗(βn) +
n+1∑
i=1
Γ1(βi)(βi+1 − βi) [qˆ(βi+1)− q¯∗(βi+1)] ,
that is, the agent again gets the same expected payoﬀ as with (−U¯∗(βn), q¯∗), but
produces eﬃciently.
Clearly, this contract satisﬁes (A.3). To check (A.5), note that for j = 1 the agent
is indiﬀerent, and thus willing to report truthfully. For all j ∈ {2, . . . ,m}, there is no
incentive to deviate either:
U ′1(βn) +
n−1∑
i=1
Γj(βi)(βi+1 − βi)q′1(βi+1)
= U¯∗(βn)−
n+1∑
i=1
Γ1(βi)(βi+1 − βi) [qˆ(βi+1)− q¯∗(βi+1)] +
n−1∑
i=1
Γj(βi)(βi+1 − βi)qˆ(βi+1)
< U¯∗(βn)−
n+1∑
i=1
Γj(βi)(βi+1 − βi) [qˆ(βi+1)− q¯∗(βi+1)] +
n−1∑
i=1
Γj(βi)(βi+1 − βi)qˆ(βi+1)
= U ′j(βn) +
n−1∑
i=1
Γj(βi)(βi+1 − βi)q′j(βi+1),
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where the inequality follows from the ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance ordering of
the posteriors and Lemma A3. Finally, (A.6) holds by (A.5) and the fact that
(−U¯∗(βn),q∗) satisﬁes (10).
By Lemma A3, (−U ′1(βn), . . . ,−U ′m(βn),q′) generates a strictly larger expected
surplus than the best contract that deters information acquisition, (−U¯∗(βn), q¯∗). On
the other hand, it provides the agent with the same expected payoﬀ. This observation
establishes W (0) > W¯ (0) and thus concludes the proof.
Proof of Theorem 1
Follows directly from Lemmas 2 and 3.
Proof of Proposition 2
Proposition 1 already established the last bullet point. For the ﬁrst bullet point, ﬁrst
ignore constraint (9). Then, (10) holds with equality at the optimum, and the best
contract is (−U¯A(β2), qˆ(β1), q¯A(β2)). This contract actually satisﬁes (9) if and only
if e ≤ eA. For the second bullet point, I ﬁrst show that both (9) and (10) hold with
equality at the optimum on (eA, eˆ). Suppose both hold with (strict) inequality. Then,
the objective could be increased by slightly increasing −U¯(β2). Suppose (9) holds
with equality but (10) with inequality. Then, e > φq¯(β2). Hence, by the deﬁnition
of eˆ, q¯(β2) < qˆ(β2), and the objective could be increased by slightly increasing q¯(β2)
and −U¯(β2) such that (9) still holds with equality. Finally, suppose (10) holds with
equality but (9) with inequality. Then, e < φq¯(β2). Hence, by the deﬁnition of e
A,
q¯(β2) > q¯
A(β2), and the objective could be increased by slightly reducing q¯(β2) and
−U¯(β2) such that (10) still holds with equality. Thus, both (9) and (10) hold with
equality. Solving for −U¯(β2) and q¯(β2) yields −U¯B(β2) and q¯B(β2).
Proof of Lemma 4
By standard arguments, (4) is equivalent to
Uj(β1)− Uj(β2) ∈ [(β2 − β1)qj(β2), (β2 − β1)qj(β1)] ∀j = O,P (A.7)
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together with the monotonicity condition (12). Given (A.7) and (5), the ﬁrst-order
stochastic dominance ordering of the posteriors (γO(β1) > γP (β1)) implies that (6)
holds if and only if
UP (β1) + γP (β1) [UP (β1)− UP (β2)] ≥ 0. (A.8)
Given (A.7), (5), and (A.8), in turn, the dominance ordering implies that in (7) the
double sum on the right hand side is nonnegative for l = P , so (7) holds if and only
if
Uj(β2) + γj(β1) [Uj(β1)− Uj(β2)]− e
pij
≥ Ul(β2) + γj(β1) [Ul(β1)− Ul(β2)] ∀j, l 6= j ∈ {O,P}.
(A.9)
Note that (A.9) implies (5). Thus, (4)(7) hold if and only if (12) and (A.7)(A.9)
hold.
Next, I show that (A.7) can without loss of generality be replaced by the stronger
conditions (15) and (16). Let (t′,q′) be any contract that satisﬁes (12) and (A.7)
(A.9), and deﬁne
O := (β2 − β1)q′O(β1)− [U ′O(β1)− U ′O(β2)]
and
P := U
′
P (β1)− U ′P (β2)− (β2 − β1)q′P (β2).
Consider the alternative contract (t′′,q′′), which diﬀers from (t′,q′) only with respect
to transfers, namely such that
t′′O(β1) = t
′
O(β1) + γO(β2)O t
′′
O(β2) = t
′
O(β2)− γO(β1)O
and
t′′P (β1) = t
′
P (β1)− γP (β2)P t′′P (β2) = t′P (β2) + γP (β1)P .
Given these transfers, the alternative contract satisﬁes (15) and (16). Moreover,
conditional on the posterior type, it results in identical expected payoﬀs for both
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parties as the original contract. Note that the alternative contract therefore satisﬁes
(A.8). As to (A.9), it holds that
U ′′O(β2) + γO(β1) [U
′′
O(β1)− U ′′O(β2)]−
e
piO
= U ′O(β2) + γO(β1) [U
′
O(β1)− U ′O(β2)]−
e
piO
≥ U ′P (β2) + γO(β1) [U ′P (β1)− U ′P (β2)]
≥ U ′P (β2) + γP (β1)P + γO(β1) [U ′P (β1)− U ′P (β2)− P ]
= U ′′P (β2) + γO(β1) [U
′′
P (β1)− U ′′P (β2)] ,
where the ﬁrst inequality follows from the fact that (t′,q′) satisﬁes (A.9) and the
second one from the ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance ordering of the posteriors. An
analogous comparison shows that the other inequality in (A.9) is met as well.
Given (15) and (16), condition (A.8) reads (13), and (A.9) is by standard argu-
ments equivalent to
UO(β2)− UP (β2) ∈
[
−γO(β1)(β2 − β1) [qO(β1)− qP (β2)] + e
piO
,
− γP (β1)(β2 − β1) [qO(β1)− qP (β2)]− e
piP
] (A.10)
together with the monotonicity condition (14).
To conclude the proof, I show that (A.10) can without loss of generality be replaced
by the stronger condition (17). Let (t†,q†) be any contract that satisﬁes (12)(14) as
well as (15), (16), and (A.10). Deﬁne
η := U †O(β2)− U †P (β2) + γO(β1)(β2 − β1)
[
q†O(β1)− q†P (β2)
]
− e
piO
.
Consider the alternative contract (t‡,q‡), which diﬀers from (t†,q†) only with respect
to transfers, namely such that for each cost type i = 1, 2
t‡O(βi) = t
†
O(βi)− piPη t‡P (βi) = t†P (βi) + piOη.
Given these transfers, the alternative contract satisﬁes (17). Moreover, conditional
on the prior, it results in identical expected payoﬀs for both parties as the original
contract. Finally, (13), (15), and (16) clearly hold as well.
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Proof of Proposition 3
Concerning qO(β1) and qP (β2), ﬁrst ignore constraint (14). Then, qˆ(β1) and q
C
P (β2)
are optimal. This choice actually satisﬁes (14) if and only if e ≤ eC . For e > eC ,
suppose (14) holds with strict inequality at the optimum. Then, at least one of the
choice variables qO(β1) and qP (β2) diﬀers from qˆ(β1) and q
C
P (β2), respectively, and the
objective could be increased by a slight modiﬁcation of that variable towards qˆ(β1)
and qCP (β2), respectively.
Proof of Proposition 4
The characterizations in Section 5.5 imply that all choice variables of the best con-
tracts converge to ﬁnite limits.14 In the following, I use the subscript l for limits.
Standard limit laws for convergent sequences (e.g., Rudin 1976, Thm. 3.3, p. 49) give
W¯l(e) = piO,l[V (q¯
∗
l (β1))− β1q¯∗l (β1)] + piP,l[V (q¯∗l (β2))− β2q¯∗l (β2)]
− U¯∗l (β2)− piO,l(β2 − β1)q¯∗l (β2)
Wl(e) = piO,l[V (q
∗
O,l(β1))− β1q∗O,l(β1)] + piP,l[V (q∗P,l(β2))− β2q∗P,l(β2)]− e
− piO,l(β2 − β1)q∗P,l(β2).
Suppose ﬁrst e = 0. Then, Propositions 2 and 3 imply
q¯∗l (β1) = q
∗
O,l(β1) q¯
∗
l (β2) = q
∗
P,l(β2) − U¯∗l (β2) = 0.
Thus, Wl(0)− W¯l(0) = 0.
Suppose now e > 0. Then, Propositions 2 and 3 imply
qˆ(β1) = q¯
∗
l (β1) ≤ q∗O,l(β1) qˆ(β2) ≥ q¯∗l (β2) ≥ q∗P,l(β2).
Thus,
Wl(e)− W¯l(e) ≤ −e+ piO,l(β2 − β1)[q¯∗l (β2)− q∗P,l(β2)] + U¯∗l (β2).
14For the output levels, note that as V ′ is continuous, one-to-one, and has an open domain, V ′−1
is continuous by Brouwer's Domain Invariance Theorem (see, e.g., Munkres 2000, 62, p. 381385).
Hence, limV ′−1(xτ ) = V ′−1(limxτ ), whenever limxτ exists.
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Whenever q¯∗l (β2) > q
∗
P,l(β2) and −U¯∗l (β2) < piO,l(β2 − β1)q¯∗l (β2), Propositions 2 and 3
moreover imply
−U¯∗l (β2) =
e
piP,l
=
φl
piP,l
[q∗O,l(β2)− q∗P,l(β2)]
=piO,l(β2 − β1)[q∗O,l(β2)− q∗P,l(β2)]
>piO,l(β2 − β1)[q¯∗l (β2)− q∗P,l(β2)].
Thus, Wl(e)− W¯l(e) < 0.
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